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Studies that compare human and animal behaviour suspend prejudices about mind, body 
and their relation, by approaching thinking in terms of behaviour.  Yet comparative 
approaches typically engage another prejudice, motivated by human social and bodily 
experience: taking the lone animal as the unit of comparison.  This prejudice informs 
Heidegger‟s and Merleau-Ponty‟s comparative studies, and conceals something 
important: that animals moving as a group in an environment can develop new sorts of 
“sense.”  The study of animal group-life thus suggests a new way of thinking about the 




We are a strange kind of animal.  We have bodies like other animal bodies, and move like 
them.  Our stories tell of these human-animal affinities, we speak of animals as totems or 
familiars, and we elucidate principles of the cosmos or society in terms of animal 
behaviour.
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  Yet, in telling, speaking and elucidating—indeed in building and thinking—
we find ourselves estranged from the animals.   
A recurrent effort of Western philosophy and science is to elucidate our strangeness 
within the genus “animal,” e.g., to differentiate us as the rational animal, the legal animal, 
the questioning animal, or a meaning creating animal.  Yet in this very effort our 
philosophy and science repeatedly put us altogether beyond the animal, in virtue of a 
mind that would have no need of an animal body.  We know that minds are an evolution 
of animal bodies; and as William James (1950, 138) points out, minds evolved to do 
something, they are efficacious.  Despite this, we are repeatedly asked to think of our 
mind as a computational or other process that could be abstracted from the efficacy of an 
animal body.  We are to imagine that a brain in a vat (not an animal-body „vat,‟ mind 
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you) could think.  We are to imagine a human mind „uploaded‟ into a robot body that was 
never born and shall never die; or a human mind „downloaded‟ into a vast holographic 
memory.  
The themes of mind, body and animals link in what I call comparative approaches 
to mind, approaches that explore the relation between thinking and the body through a 
comparison of humans and animals.  This paper arrives at conceptual results about 
thinking, the body and nature by studying a prejudice in the usual comparison of humans 
and animals.  In the first part I show how prejudices faced in overcoming mind-body 
dualism motivate comparative approaches.  Heidegger (1995) and Merleau-Ponty (1965) 
adopt comparative approaches in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics  and The 
Structure of Behaviour, books that characterize our thinking-being through an existential-
phenomenological comparison of human and animal behaviour.  In part two I show that 
Heidegger‟s and Merleau-Ponty‟s comparative approaches are nonetheless marred by 
another prejudice, which I call the prejudice of the lone animal.  Despite their aim of 
avoiding artificial construction of the phenomena, both philosophers analyze the 
behaviour of lone animals, whereas animal life is pervasively a group phenomenon.  In 
part three I show how animals appear as doing something much closer to being-in-the-
world, or even thinking, if we study animals living and moving together—albeit their 
„being-in-the-world‟ has a different temporal dimension than ours.  In part four I wrest a 
general insight from these results, about distributed animal movement as creative.  I then 
suggest how we might reconceive our bodies and brains as akin to a pack of animals 
roped into an internal environment.   
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Behind this paper is a point urged by Renaud Barbaras (1999), namely that the task 
of “naturalizing” a phenomenological account of mind would require a new way of 
thinking about nature as phenomenal, rather than a reduction of phenomena to nature as 
the physicist conceives it.
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  In pursuit of this point, the paper engages in conceptual 
exploration, in the spirit of Merleau-Ponty‟s (1982, 183) exhortation that “If we begin our 
search for truth with an eye for conclusions, there is no more philosophy.”  I am trying to 
see what happens if we go all the way with turning to the animals for a way of thinking 
mind—and nature—anew. 
1) Thinking as Animal 
If mind and body are one, then thinking is a matter of the whole body in its world.  
Consider a sailing ship: it goes nowhere without sails, but we would be fools to think that 
sails—on their own—make the ship go.  Sails are nothing without masts, yards and 
booms to hold them, a hull to float them, a rudder to steer the hull, and wind to catch the 
sails.  Compare the typical approach to mind: mind doesn‟t go anywhere without a brain; 
thinking correlates with neurons firing, as in a complex cognitive device; therefore the 
brain—on its own—is the engine of thinking.  Implicit in this conclusion are the 
following abstractions and errors: that a brain could live to think without a skull-bearing 
body to guard it; that there would be things to think about absent the brain‟s part in a 
moving body sensitive to things; that a brain cut from the winds of the world could blow 
itself out of its doldrums into thinking; that thinking needn‟t catch hold of language, 
writing and communication.   
Whence such abstractions and errors?  Especially after Descartes, we are prejudiced 
in conceiving thinking as individual, self-contained and abstract.  So we attack dualism 
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by attaching mind to the only organ that could plausibly yield abstraction, namely the 
brain conceived as akin to a human-made symbol processing or recognitive device.
4
  We 
thus engage another prejudice, viz. analyzing natural phenomena on the model of human-
made mechanisms, and a related prejudice of artificially isolating natural phenomena 
from their contexts.  Perhaps the prejudice underlying all of these is a refusal to conceive 
thinking as animal, as an activity of an animal, an activity that is fundamentally animate 
in character.
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  Our tradition teaches that human thinking is unlike any other animal 
activity, and the fact that we can experience thinking as a private, quiet affair encourages 
thinking the tradition is right.  So thinking has a dignity that could be found only in a 
most un-animal part of the body, namely a brain dignified by functioning like a human-
made machine.  
To overcome this set of abstractions and errors we would have to dump our 
traditional prejudices overboard and chart a new course.  We should make a fresh start, 
beginning with the hypothesis that human thinking is an activity of a body, abandoning 
dualism altogether so that we do not presuppose what either mind or body are, or force 
them into a conceptual slots specified by the sorts of mechanism we can construct or the 
sorts of process we are good at analyzing.  We should then ask what thinking is qua such 
an animal activity.
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  On this course, the best approach is comparative: asking how human 
thinking as animal activity differs from or overlaps with other animal activity.  Why is 
the comparative approach best?  To begin with a prejudice is to coin a conceptual model 
that specifies a spectrum of variability in which we then try to slot natural diversity.  In 
contrast, a comparative project begins by studying nature‟s own variability, and then 
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seeks insight into a conceptual model that articulates the unity and diversity of natural 
variability.   
Two illustrations: 1) Colour has been a notoriously difficult philosophical topic, 
mostly because the traditional prejudice of the subject-object distinction forces colour 
into either subjective or objective slots, which leads to inherent difficulties.  In contrast, 
Evan Thompson‟s  comparative approach begins with a study of creatures whose eye 
pigmentation yields very different colour spaces (Thompson 1995; Thompson, Palacios, 
and Varela 1992).  This enables a fresh start that reconceives colour in terms of a 
„problem‟ that is „solved‟ in different ways in different animal bodies.  In turn, this shows 
that colour is neither objective nor subjective, but is an ecological, evolutionary relation 
between organisms and environments.  2) We engineer machines, and it is easy to 
imagine how the engineer‟s mindset would set up slots that prejudice analyses of animal 
walking.  Robert Full and Claire Farley (2000) instead compare the movements of a 
diverse set of actual walking, hopping and creeping creatures, thus gaining an insight into 
natural „engineering.‟ They discovered that in all these creatures legs work as springy 
organs over which animal bodies hurtle.  This enables a fresh start in the analysis of 
walking. 
Comparative approaches help us do good phenomenology.  Instead of beginning 
with our prejudices, we try to attend to the way that nature has prejudiced itself in 
evolving living differences.   
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger takes a comparative 
approach to metaphysical questions partly for this reason.  Having deduced the 
phenomenon of “world,” from a long but not at all boring study of boredom, he turns to 
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the question of what “world” is for Dasein.  The question would be begged if we started 
from the traditional prejudices (e.g., that the distinctiveness of “world” stems from our 
rationality).  Instead, Heidegger lets the existing difference between human and animal 
„worlds‟ tell him what “world” is; he tries to figure out what we mean when we say 
Dasein is in the world by contrasting this claim with the claim that the animal is world 
impoverished.  Even though Heidegger would not pose his question in terms of mind, or 
thinking, but in terms of Dasein, what he has to say will help us with the philosophy of 
mind (as, e.g., Olafson (1987) and Dreyfus (1992) have shown).  Significantly for us, his 
comparison turns on a study of behaviour—perhaps the closest Heidegger gets to direct 
study of the body. 
On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty‟s explicit topic in The Structure of Behaviour is 
the relation between consciousness and nature.  He pursues this relation by first of all 
turning to behaviour as a phenomenon in which consciousness and nature, body and 
mind, are inseparable.  Having given a conceptual analysis of behaviour, he then takes a 
comparative approach that distinguishes the vital order from the human order in terms of 
differences in structures of behaviour within these two phenomenal orders—and since he 
really doesn‟t talk about plants his comparison is of human and animal orders. 
As Heidegger points out, such a comparative approach immediately sinks in 
methodological difficulties.  The most pressing is this: philosophical or scientific 
comparison of human and animal phenomena already presupposes a pre-philosophical, 
pre-scientific distinction between humans and animals, some way of picking out the 
human from the animal.  The circle is unavoidable, and there is no use bemoaning it.  To 
even raise the question of the difference between the human and animal is already, as it 
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were, to perform a pre-philosophical sense of that distinction.  Raising the question 
differentiates us as the animal who cares to speak about our difference from other 
animals.  More, our pursuit of the question presupposes our ability to transpose ourselves 
into the „world‟ of the animal—which is to say it presupposes Dasein‟s being-in-the-
world qua accessibility to other beings.   
We could follow Heidegger‟s path and resign ourselves to a certain amount of 
question begging that stems from the very structure of our questioning.  But if we worry 
our way into these Heideggerian depths, an important question that need not be begged, a 
question that we can pursue, gets concealed, namely: granted a sense of what animals are, 
what should we be studying when we study animal behaviour?  In taking a comparative 
approach to mind, it appears obvious to us that humanly mindful behaviour is the 
behaviour of a single body, so we compare single human bodies to single animal bodies.  
More, it appears obvious to us that animals, especially „lower‟ animals, do not „think‟ in 
the way that we do; if they did, our comparison would not yield an answer to our problem 
as we posed it.  In other words, the usual comparative approach is prejudiced by studying 
the behaviour of the lone animal, and by the anticipation that animals do not „think‟ like 
us.  I want to show how these two prejudices intertwine in a way that conceals something 
important about animals, and thence about us.   
2) The Prejudice of  the Lone Animal 
Why is that philosophers and scientists, when comparing human and animal cognitive 
ability, typically compare a human with an animal, rather than humans and animals as 
groups?  Whither this prejudice of the lone animal?  I am going to pursue this question in 
relation to the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty because they are philosophers who 
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should know better than to fall for prejudices, especially since they are taking a 
comparative approach precisely to escape traditional prejudices. 
To emphasize what is at stake here, I want to say a bit more about Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, and their sensitive ways of avoiding other prejudices.  In their 
comparative approaches, both philosophers turn to thinkers such as Uexküll and 
Goldstein, thinkers who analyze organisms in terms of overall behaviour rather than as 
biophysical systems.  Drawing on these resources and their observations, Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty insist that the unit of analysis is not the human or animal organism as a 
closed system, rather organisms and humans are correlative to and inseparable from the 
surround in which they live.  Merleau-Ponty is most sensitive on this point, arguing that 
the animal as object of laboratory experiments is an artifact, a preparation, a being that is 
very distant from the animal in its own environment, to the extent that conclusions 
extrapolated from testing the animal in the lab have very remote bearing on the animal in 
the wild.  Both philosophers are strikingly insightful in their refusal to separate animals 
from their environments, an insight that will be developed, later on, in ecological and 
autopoieitic conceptions of organisms (cf. Gibson 1966; Varela 1991). 
So it is quite striking when these philosophers focus on individual animals: as if an 
animal embedded in its environment were not embedded in relations with other animals! 
In more detail, Heidegger says that we live in the world, whereas an animal is world 
impoverished.  While our being in the world depends on being-with one another (mitsein) 
(since, e.g., our being, Dasein, is interpretation, etc.), and the human term of Heidegger‟s 
comparison is thus collective or plural
7
, Heidegger contrasts our sort of being with what 
we would find, say, in the behaviour of an individual bee or lizard.  Merleau-Ponty says 
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that the human order is distinctive in establishing significances through the cultural 
creation of language and tools that invest the world with new and ambiguous meanings.  
While a primate sometimes uses a stick as a tool, it only does so, Merleau-Ponty argues, 
if the stick is so placed as to fall in line with the animal‟s behavioural explorations.  Even 
when the animal uses the stick as a tool, the stick is treated all and only as a tool, whereas 
for a human the stick at once and ambiguously has the meaning of stick and tool.  For 
both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty the crucial point is that human life inherently 
involves an as relation: we relate to things in the world as this or that, we can create new 
meanings and behaviours by reinterpreting what things figure as, so for us things have 
variable or ambiguous meanings that need to be negotiated.  We thus have a special sort 
of distance or separation from things around us.  We aren‟t in the world in the same way 
the animal is, because we have to make something of the world, whereas for an animal 
things are already laid out.  And for us this making something of the world has to do with 
language and interpretation, with the collective being of human beings.  
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are making an important point that is in many ways 
right.  But there is something wrongheaded about a comparison that puts a necessarily 
intersubjective human world on one side, and the behaviour of a lone animal on the other.  
The problem is not that the comparison is unfair because humans overwhelm or outfox 
the lone animal—although this is an issue.  The problem is that the lone animal is an 
abstraction.  Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger would not even dream of decoupling an 
animal from its environment, or decoupling humans from one another, but in their 
analyses they seem to decouple animals from their congeners, and take the individual 
animal-environment couple as their unit of analysis.  While sensitive to other prejudices 
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of our tradition, they fall into what I call the prejudice of the lone animal, that is, 
characterizing animal behavioural capacities through studies of individual animals, rather 
than groups. 
Even if I am mistaken about Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, it is quite evident that 
comparative approaches in science and philosophy often repeat this prejudice of studying 
lone animals.
8
  But we need to draw a distinction between two divergent yet intersecting 
axes of human-animal comparison.  I call these the political and the psychological, in 
honour of the works in which Aristotle marks out these axes.  In the Politics (bk. 1, ch. 
1), Aristotle argues that bees and other gregarious creatures communicate, but that only 
humans speak about the good.  This does compare humans and animals as groups, and 
that is because the underlying aim is distinguishing human and animal society, rather than 
humans and animals as such.  This sort of comparison on the political axis recurs in 
observations that, e.g., humans are different than animals because we lie to one another, 
wage war, institute traditions, have funeral rites.  (But maybe some primates or cetaceans 
lie, wage war, or have behavioural and even linguistic traditions—it depends on what we 
mean by these terms. (Cf. Whiten and Byrne 1988; Rendell and Whitehead 2001))   
On the other hand, in Aristotle‟s On the Soul (bk. 2, ch. 3) the comparison is drawn 
in terms of faculties whose locus is individual humans and animals: human soul has 
noetic as well as sentient and nutritive capacities, in comparison with animal soul that is 
merely sentient.  This facultative comparison becomes ever more prominent with 
materialism and the rise of the mind-body problem, with the accomplishments of modern 
biology, psychology and neuroscience, in short with a science and philosophy that grasps 
the biological organism as the unit of life and attempts to understand human differentia as 
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capacities of the animal Homo sapiens.  In any case, this psychological axis is our main 
concern, given our starting point in questions about mind and body.  (Of course, if I am 
right that the lone animal is a prejudice, then the two axes of contrast are far more 
convergent then we might have thought.)  
Empirical observation gives us good reason to think that the lone animal is, in 
psychological comparisons, as much an abstraction and artifact as Merleau-Ponty‟s 
laboratory organism.  The pervasive form of animal life is that of the flock, herd, pack, 
hive, nest, shoal, colony—we have a swarm of words for designating the group-life of 
animals.  Animals live as group-beings.  
Of course, counter-examples creep up right away.  Some animals do not seem to 
explicitly coordinate their behaviours, they don‟t visibly flock, herd, or manifest a group-
life.  Nonetheless, they live in populations that collectively transform ecological niches in 
ways that implicate their lives in one another‟s behaviour, e.g., caterpillars on a tree, sea-
urchins grazing a lagoon, cockroaches scavenging.  Evidence for the interlocking of such 
animals‟s behaviours is that they are susceptible of group control by human “wranglers” 
who figure out how to “wrangle” them as a group (e.g., when it comes time to make a 
horror movie in which the human is overrun by herds of cockroaches, or to shoot the 
television commercial in which caterpillars make a bee-line for a cellular phone, etc.).   
The most prominent exceptions to animal group-life are not creepy, but big-bodied 
hunters: lions, tigers and bears.  But such animals first of all have to break from the pride 
or pack, and then make company with prey, and compete with peers.  Even the “lone 
wolf” is not really alone.  Again, we might find exceptions in castaways left behind in 
migrations; or in animals cast out of groups that have social rankings and roles, such as 
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primates or elephants.  But the castaways are hobbled, and the castouts often shadow the 
periphery of their group.  These are cases of dysfunctional group-life rather than an 
absence of group-life.  (We would also have to talk about pets, who seem to live in 
isolation from other animals, but complications are rife.  First, pets obviously live in 
groups with humans.  Second, because of their domestic formation and intimacy with 
humans they do not seem to be the right sort of animal to draw on in a comparison of 
humans and animal.  In any case, any one who has taken a dog for a walk in the park 
knows dogs aren‟t loners.) 
These points about animals should not surprise us, since animals are born of other 
animals and live by eating other animals or plants.  Animal bodies, in other words, are 
constituted by an incompleteness.
9
  This is why Aristotle (On the Soul bk. 2, ch. 4) 
insisted that the reality of animals is not in the individual but in the species‟ cycle of 
birth, death and reproduction; why Bergson (1998) argued that biological individuality is 
a tendency rather than a fully accomplished state; why philosophers of biology (Sober 
1994; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; also see Gould 2002) recurrently question the unit of 
evolution and tilt between taking individual organisms and populations as the “real thing” 
that evolves, and why philosophers of immanence (DeLanda 2002) insist on the priority 
of populations over individuals. 
Conceptually and empirically, the lone animal is an abstraction or construction.  
You find them in zoos or houses but not in nature, except in death, decimation or 
extinction.  Given that animals are born from one another, live together and very often do 
things together, isn‟t the attempt to distinguish humans from animals through focus on 
individual behaviour as misguided as trying to distinguishing a gas from a liquid by 
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looking at just one molecule, or distinguishing one melody from another by sounding just 
one note?  Can the fact that an animal can biologically survive on its own—and here 
we‟d have to note that to get it to do that you typically have to cage it—warrant an 
analysis of them as loners?  No, that is an abstract and poor way of thinking.  So why 
does the prejudice of the lone animal haunt our philosophy?  Why do we think this way?   
The answer is that it is a human way of thinking.  Pre-philosophical attitudes 
inherent in human life shape philosophical thinking.  If we import these attitudes into 
philosophy, they can motivate philosophical prejudice.  Phenomenology dwells on this 
problem, as do thinkers such as Dewey (1958) and Bergson (1998; 2002),  who are 
helpful in linking such prejudices to evolutionary and social motives.  Bergson (2002), 
e.g., notes that our biologically and pragmatically motivated attunement to handling 
discrete and solid objects inclines us to model all processes as the interaction of discrete 
solids; but when we uncritically carry that model over into philosophy, it motivates a 
prejudice that betrays the continuous becoming in which things arise.  Similarly, I link 
the prejudice of the lone animal to two motives of human life, one appearing on the 
political axis of human-animal comparison, the other on the psychological axis.  
On the political axis, we can observe that humans experience a strange kind of 
loneliness.  This experience of loneliness is—quite paradoxically—well motivated by our 
social being: the misery of loneliness is useful in driving us to the social.  Other animals 
would seem to experience this kind of loneliness; e.g., we often hear reports of isolated 
animals, especially primates, whales and dolphins, who appear to die from loneliness.  
Human political-social being, however, motivates a further kind of loneliness, since it 
demands that we take responsibility for ourselves, make up our own minds, listen to an 
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inner daimon instead of running with the pack.  Where the use of loneliness in other 
animals is its being a non-viable lack that drives animals together, we can seemingly deal 
with or create „viable,‟ socially useful forms of loneliness, e.g., in being or claiming to be 
off in our books, in our hermitages, in our minds.  While Aristotle urges that the isolate 
man is a god or a beast, human society, in good and bad ways, often enjoins, enables or 
makes use of beastly or divine loneliness.  This aspect of human political being can 
motivate or make plausible a prejudiced world view in which we take animals to be 
political loners like ourselves—forgetting that our political or intellectual loneliness is in 
fact an abstraction and depends upon the polis.  
On the psychological axis of human-animal comparison (remembering that 
“psychology” is here being used in Aristotle‟s sense), our concern is the animating 
principles that hold animals together as having animate capacities.  On this axis we can 
detect a motive for the prejudice of the lone animal first by studying a disparity between 
our concept of bodily individuality and our experience of it, second by identifying a 
motive of that disparity.  I am going to pursue this disparity within the framework of 
biology, since this will also help with larger conceptual points.  
In recent years biologists have tried to give a rigorous evolutionary account of 
biological individuality and sexual reproduction.  The underlying conceptual problem is 
deeper than it seems on first glance.  After all, as Bergson (1998) observed, it would be 
possible, and in some sense plausible, to look at a tree and see a bunch of living plants 
stuck on the end of nearly-dead wood, to see a tree as we would see a coral reef; and 
anybody whose garden has been besieged by a lilac knows that a lilac keeps on turning 
into new trees.  In the first case, why should we say there is one tree, rather than a colony 
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of organisms growing on the skeletal remains of previous generations?  In the second 
case, why should we say there is one tree, rather than a family of them?  What is that 
makes a bunch of cells count as one being?  The problem is more striking when we turn 
to animals like ourselves:  Why do I or any other animal count as one being, rather than a 
bunch of loosely knit cells or parts, or as an offshoot biologically continuous with my 
parents?  While animal behaviour and growth give us ready phenomenological 
experience of animal individuality, careful consideration shows that it is difficult, on the 
level of biological analysis, to answer the question of animal individuality without 
begging it.  
The embryologist Leo Buss (1987) has proposed a controversial yet well received 
and intriguing answer to this question, one in which individuality and reproduction co-
evolve.  In his account, an animal that we perceive as individual is really to be understood 
as an ongoing result of a conflict between competing cells lines, and individuality can 
take quite different forms across different genera.  Further, body cells of individual 
animals are „programmed‟ to die, and in evolutionary terms this is understood as an 
imperative of the species built into the individual (“die so your that decrepit cells won‟t 
mess up the gene pool, die to make way for others”).  Conversely, in animals, non-
genetic factors contributed by the female parent are crucial to embryogenesis and the 
developed body-plan of the individual.  Put together, these points reveal that the temporal 
and spatial finitude that mark the biological individual, death and development, is 
mediated by the species, and that the individual is the ongoing result of a conflict within 
the evolutionary and reproductive process of the species.  Individuality is not an 
immediate possession of an individual organism. 
 16  
This conceptual point bolsters the empirical observations made above.  
Individuality is not given in our body all at once as complete, a point that comes to the 
fore in immunological contexts, in reproduction and in sexuality.
10
  Non-individuality is 
the original condition of organic being, in the way that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty tell 
us that intersubjectivity is the original condition of human being.  And then we would 
have to say the following, seemingly paradoxical thing: that the non-individuality of 
animals is manifest precisely through their apparent individuality, since their 
individuality is in fact a phenomenon of biological and behavioural interdependence.  
The phenomenon of animal group-life manifests the paradox of an individuality that 
could never be complete.  (I leave it to the reader to reflect on the parallel between the 
paradox of individuality, and the paradox of loneliness.)  
If, conceptually, individuality is inherently incomplete, not the possession of an 
individual, why have we, for so long, thought otherwise, thought that an animal is, in its 
very own being, unproblematically one integral thing that stops at the skin?  In dealing 
with this sort of question, Buss points out a prejudice in prior accounts: taking as 
paradigmatic organisms in which there is a strict separation between germ and somatic 
cell lines (which is not true, e.g., in some organisms that bud) and that have a single body 
plan from birth (vs. organisms like caterpillars or jellyfish that change body plans as they 
grow).  These prejudices and their tributaries can be traced to various moments in the 
history of evolutionary theory, especially the germ theory of August Weisman (1893).  
But really the prejudice amounts to this: taking the reproductive cycle of animals like 
ourselves as paradigmatic of reproduction in all organisms, as if all animals are like us or 
those animals most familiar to us, i.e. vertebrates.  (Also: taking animal reproduction (vs. 
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plant reproduction) as paradigmatic of reproduction in general, a prejudice not at all 
surprising given that animals better exemplify the lineages and sexual divisions that 
preoccupy traditional views of reproduction; the traditional fables and totems bear upon  
foxes, lions and bees, not pennyworts or seaslugs—let alone slime molds.)  To put it 
bluntly, Buss suggests we have misconceived the evolution of individuality and sexuality 
because we have traditionally and prejudicially conceived other organisms on the model 
of our own living organism—which turns out to be peculiar amidst other organisms.   
On the psychological axis, the sort of body that we humans have and experience has 
prejudiced our biological thinking.  Putting aside Buss‟s evolutionary biology, we can 
see how our experience, on psychological and political axes, generally motivates the 
prejudice of the lone animal.  We, more than other animals, live apparently solitary lives 
and are taught to experience, at least in modern Western society, our organism as a self-
contained pragmatic-cognitive unit.  Our everyday experience of the lived body is of 
something that stops at the skin.  Because we can lead an isolate “life of the mind” we are 
inclined to think of animal life as an isolate affair.  It is no wonder that the lone scholar is 
inclined to the study of the lone animal.  Or rather, that the Western lone scholar is so 
inclined.  As Frans de Waal (2001, 2003) shows, the history of primatology suggests 
sharp differences between Euro-American and Japanese attitudes to primates, with the 
former inclined to study individual primates as interchangeable and anonymous, and the 
latter inclined to study groups of primates as named individuals.
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As is well known, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology generally show 
that our bodies and lives are not isolate affairs.  So why should we extend a prejudicially 
isolate view of life to animals, unless we have (prejudicially) presumed that animals, in 
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contrast to humans, do not have a group-life?  The points discussed above, if not our 
commitment to phenomenology, suggest that we had best throw the prejudice of the lone 
animal overboard, if only to see what results.  In urging this I am not saying that 
Heidegger‟s and Merleau-Ponty‟s results are utterly wrong, indeed, there is something to 
be learned from those results qua comparisons of individuals.  I am saying their results 
are incomplete, one sided, and that we shall miss something important if we stick with 
the prejudice.  So we must ask: What happens when we compare humans and animals by 
studying group behaviour?  
3) Minding the Animals 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, §59, Heidegger studies bees.  He cites an 
experiment in which a bee with a severed abdomen endlessly sucks honey from a bowl.  
In contrast, an unmutilated bee sucks honey until its abdomen is full and then flies back 
to the hive.  On Heidegger‟s understanding, the observation of the mutilated bee shows 
that an unmutilated bee does not “recognize the presence of surplus honey.” (242) That 
is, a bee does not recognize presence, does not recognize an environmental configuration 
as something over and above an immediately captivating interaction.  With Merleau-
Ponty‟s and Goldstein‟s help we could say instead that a mutilated bee is a bee only for 
the experimenter who “prepares” it, that it is no longer really a bee, that it can‟t behave 
toward the bowl in a bee-like manner because it has lost its belly.  We might also say that 
the full belly of the (unmutilated) bee flying away from the scent of the bowl is an animal 
recognition of surplus honey.  Instead of manifesting recognition in language or 
individual behaviour, this is a recognition of surplus in a kind of movement to be read 
against the overall movements of the hive.  A mutilated bee can‟t show this kind of 
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recognition.  But then again, a human who has lost the feeling of pain may lose the ability 
to show, in individual behaviour, recognition of dangerous things in hand, yet recognition 
of danger can nonetheless be read in the individual‟s behaviour in virtue of fellows 
alongside who help point out the danger.   
Heidegger also argues that bees do not recognize flowers as such.  Why?  Each bee, 
according to his evidence, is imprinted on just one type of flower.  A bee imprinted on 
clover will just land on clover, a bee imprinted on honeysuckle will just land on 
honeysuckle.  In this case we are talking about real bees, not laboratory preparations.  It 
does seem that a clover-fixated bee is incapable of recognizing clover as something more 
than an immediately captivating interaction, as a flower.  But what if we talked about 
bees rather than a bee?  Presumably a hive of bees transported into a new floral region, or 
living in a region where the flora slowly or suddenly changes, would gather nectar from 
whatever flora happen to be around.  Perhaps many individual bees would never make 
the shift, but if no bees in the hive made the shift, the hive would surely die out.  So a 
hive of bees animally treats flowers as flowers, or at least as „nectar source,‟ for the hive 
as a whole sucks up whatever has nectar in it.  A bee may be captivated (to use 
Heidegger‟s word) by just one type of interaction with the environment, by what we 
recognize as just one type of flower, but a hive of bees cannot be so captivated, they 
animally recognize nectar sources in a general way, indeed recognize novel things such 
as honey bowls and trashed soda-pop cans as nectar sources.  Absent that, hives would 
die out and evolution would be impossible.   
Indeed, if animals are coupled with environments, and environments change, an 
animal captivated by a static feature of the environment is dead or short lived—which is 
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perfectly possible.  But for life to evolve, groups of animals must be flexible in their 
animal recognition of the environment.  So Heidegger is right only if he is thinking of the 
isolate or mutilated bee, and the isolate bee is, animally speaking, a mutilated bee, as 
Aristotle‟s isolate man is a beast.  Evolution entails group non-captivation, mutability of 
behaviour across a group.  Below we will see how this can be so, how a group can be 
flexible, where an individual is not. 
To get there, let us turn from bees to dogs.  Kym Maclaren has drawn the following 
point about dogs from the work of Gregory Bateson: 
Gregory Bateson has argued that the rituals, for instance, that two dogs enact in meeting and greeting 
each other are not instinctual in the sense of being pre-programmed and automatic.  The rituals are 
rather a matter of the two dogs expressively and intercorporeally determining the situation, and working 
out a shared world.  Animals, Bateson asserts, cannot use negations.  They cannot say “I will not bite.” 
What they do, instead, is they act out a kind of reductio ad absurdum: they play at biting and fighting, 
for instance, in order to reveal to each other that “it is biting that I am not doing.” In this way, they 
“discover or rediscover friendship.” Through an intercorporeal dance, they bring to expression a 
situation in which each is confirmed as the friend of the other.
12
  
Dogs are instinctually related to other dogs as potential threats.  In individual dog-bodies 
this is shown by familiar expressive behaviour studied by Darwin: baring of teeth,  
attacking, etc., to assert dominance; slinking and so on to show submission.  If we only 
looked at individual dogs, we would think they are merely captivated by other dogs, 
either dominating or submitting to them, in the way that bees, according to Heidegger, 
are captivated by flowers.  We would think an individual dog incapable of recognizing 
another dog as something beyond a captivating threat.  But when we turn to dogs, 
Maclaren‟s analysis of Bateson reveals something beyond instinctual behaviour. 
The crucial point is that to show that “it is biting that I am not doing,” the dog must 
perform biting, whilst not actually biting.  Performing biting that is not biting thus entails 
something like a behavioural “as,” doing something that is not what it appears to be.  But 
this behavioural “as” requires another dog not to bite, and this means a dog who does not 
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bite back.  In this behavioural complex biting appears as something other than a 
captivating dictate of instinct: the dogs behaviourally recognize biting as „doing‟ 
„friendship.‟  They likewise recognize each other‟s bodies as something more than a 
captivating pole of a dominate-or-submit instinct, they behaviourally recognize in each 
other a dominating body (a biting-fighting body) that is behaving as not dominating.  The 
dogs see one another, are captivated by and lope toward the distant foe, ready to attack; 
but their individual lines of captivation couple and swing into an “intercorporeal dance,” 
a circle and tumble of play-biting.  The mutual captivation of biting paradoxically negates 
the captivation of biting, in the behaviour: “it is biting that I am not doing.”   
An individual dog or bee is what John Russon (1994) has called a “hermeneutical 
machine.”13  It interprets the environment according to instinctive imperatives.  What we 
have just seen is that when canine “hermeneutical machines” work together they can 
transcend instinctive imperatives.   
I will now develop a general conceptual account of this phenomenon by drawing an 
analogy with music.  There is an extraordinary difference between words listed together 
in a dictionary list, and words hanging together in a sentence.  Similarly, there is an 
extraordinary difference between the list of notes an instrument (or set of instruments) 
can produce, and notes hanging together in a melody.  Hearing words as a sentence or 
notes as a melody means intuiting an overall sense in virtue of which parts are not merely 
items in a list, but are intimately interrelated in a manner transformative of the sense of 
each part, as indicative of a sense of the whole.
14
  Producing a sentence or melody would 
seem to require an intuition of this sort of sense, as would changing the sentence or 
melody that one is producing.  In what follows I want to show how animal groups can, 
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because of their moving, interactive structure, as it were develop changing melodic 
senses without individual members of the group having explicit intuitions of this sense.  
In this way animal groups can transcend the instincts of individual animals. 
So let us think of an individual animal as a sort of ecological instrument that 
resonates its environment so as to play a limited set of notes.  An individual bee can 
sound the note “clover-nectar-source” or “hive,” but an individual bee cannot substitute 
other notes that have a related tonal character, or recognize its one note as something 
more, in virtue of its relation to that general tonal character.  An individual dog can sound 
the notes “dominate” or “submit,” but cannot recognize that there is a tonal opposition 
between these two notes, which suggests a resolution in another sort of note that 
transforms both. 
In other words, at a given time, an individual animal is resonantly captivated by the 
environment and sounds just one note.  The individual animal is like a person who can 
play a couple of notes but has no idea that notes are not singular but hang together 
harmonically, melodically and rhythmically.  Back to bees and dogs: The individual bee 
is like a person who can sound the middle-A on a piano, but cannot notice that an A on a 
trumpet or in another piano register is an A as well.  The hive of bees, in contrast, is like 
a person captivated by a melody with an A in it, but at least capable of playing variations 
on A (“go to honeysuckle for nectar!” is a variation on “go to clover for nectar!”).  The 
individual dog is like a person who can play two notes of a chord, but cannot hear them 
as a chord, because a solo dog-body can only play one note at a time.  The dog-duo is like 
two such people who, when playing their notes together, hear a chord for the first time, 
and in the beats of the chord hear its resolution in a transformation of the chordal tension 
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(the individual lines of “domination” vs. “submission” resolve in the circle-dance of “this 
domination is not domination”).  Individual animals may be locked into rote 
environmental resonations, sounding a fixed repertoire of notes; but groups of animals 
can implicitly perform variations, chordal resolutions, or melodies in a sort of collective 
melodic reading of the environment.    
Now let us turn to a hungry pack of wild dogs hunting a rabbit in a forest.  They 
work as a group, trying to hound the rabbit down, surround it, or corner it in an 
impassable ravine.  They exhibit remarkably co-ordinated skills, moving together in 
anticipation of the rabbit‟s movements.  But suppose the rabbit escapes, bursting out of 
the forest into a parking lot.  Perhaps we see the following.  Where before the dogs used 
trees as cover or barriers to trap the rabbit, here they try to use lightposts, where before 
they had tried to drive the rabbit toward rock and earth barriers, here they drive the rabbit 
toward the odd car parked in the lot.  But perhaps the lightposts are too sparse and 
skinny, and cars have hiding spots beneath, from which the rabbit must be rooted.  Forest 
movements do not work here.  So the dogs start moving in a different way, driving the 
rabbit into the open but encircling it from afar, taking advantage of the long distance 
visibility found in blank parking lots but not in forests.  Eventually, their dog-bodies 
stand to one another and to the rabbit as a circle of no escape, a sort of two-way canine 
panopticon, in which the rabbit runs back and forth until exhausted.
15
  
To be sure, these dogs remain individually captivated by rabbit chasing instincts.  
They sound their usual dog-notes.  But they act on these instincts as a pack.  So each 
dog‟s instinct is mediated by the every other dog‟s instinct, by a pack-movement of dogs 
interacting with a shifting environment, in relation to a rabbit.  Different individual dogs 
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sound different notes at different moments because of their differing locations in the 
terrain.  Further, each dog‟s chase has a different temporal and rhythmic contour (because 
each dog must chase ahead of the rabbit, along the rabbit‟s  trajectory, and each dog will 
see a different trajectory; more, each dog‟s momentum constrains its possibility of 
initiating or changing movement and thence its rhythm of movement
16
).  So instead of 
riffling through the limited set of notes specified by individual canine instincts, dogs are 
sounding notes diversified by spatial distributions and temporal lags, yet linked in one 
pack performance.  Because the dogs are moving together, they cannot just sound their 
notes, their notes get caught in differences with other notes.  A sort of improvisation is 
going on.  The improvisation isn‟t governed by self-consciously constructed rules of 
music-making, but by the way differences insert themselves in instinctual dog-rabbit 
captivation, when a rabbit ropes dogs together and drags them dispersively through a 
landscape.  Were we to invoke a model of human machinic music-making, we might 
think of the dogs as record-player needles moving resonantly over the terrain, and the 
rabbit as a sort of lapine-DJ who scratches the needles in different directions so they keep 
lagging out of sync.  When we get to the parking lot, the records change; the dogs first 
attempt their usual sort of improvisatory routine, they try to play the parking lot as 
familiar forest terrain; but then the very different temporal contour that comes from the 
visibility and thence long distance coordination of playing this smoothly open terrain, 
gets their notes to fall together in a different way.  A new melody comes together, 
sounding a death knell for the rabbit.  
On this analysis, there is a sort of creativity or generality that erupts in animal 
behaviour when their bodies couple.  Such coupling, which is necessarily spread out, 
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introduces spatially and temporally distributed differences into a network of coupled 
instincts.  An individual animal is exquisitely evolved to resonate a limited set of notes in 
its environment, and so it seems captivated with its environment.  But when the animal 
couples with others, its environmental resonance is broken because it is no longer acting 
on its own, it is resonating to other locations in terrain and moments in time, it gets 
caught in a larger melodics.  Where an individual animal is captivated with a few 
resonant notes, group animal movement can break this resonance up and read a new 
melodics in collective environmental interactions.  Without our having to say that 
animals explicitly know how to or aim at doing what they are doing, animals, in their 
collective movement can enact something like the transition between sounding isolate 
notes and linking notes in a musical system.  That is, animals can do something that 
amounts to „reading‟ a new sense of their environment.  Conceptually, the interesting 
thing is that this sense results from a coupling of individual animal-environment 
resonances, a coupling that results in frictions and lags, and thence in a breakage of those 
otherwise captivating resonances.    
Sense as it were arises from a „dance‟ that couples animals together in relation to 
one another and their environment, over spatio-temporal difference.  I use the word 
“dance” to draw a link between the above analysis—which is driven by philosophical-
conceptual concerns—and a research program recently proposed by scientists studying 
ape language. In a controversial target article by in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
Shanker and King (2002) report on and urge a paradigm shift in ape language research: 
from conceiving ape language according to a transmission metaphor, in which language 
is transmission of information from one individual to another, to conceiving it in terms of 
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a “dance metaphor,” in which linguistic communication is a joint product of rhythmic 
interaction between moving partners.  As Johnson (2001) suggests, such a view of 
primate cognition as a “distributed” phenomenon is part of a paradigm shift that also 
impacts the study of human cognition, one in which behaviour is no longer taken as the 
basis for inference to invisible mental events, but in which communicative interaction—
joint animal movement—is itself taken as a directly observable cognitive event.17  In this 
paradigm shift, we could say, thinking isn‟t (just) “in the head,” it is also there in  
movement that crosses individuals.  
We can head toward a different point about thinking by returning briefly to what 
Merleau-Ponty says about primates, in order to reconsider traditional human-animal 
comparisons.  Merleau-Ponty argues that while a primate will take up a stick in line with 
its behaviour and use it as a tool, the stick is all and only a tool, whereas humans search 
out sticks and recognize them at once as stick and as tool.  But let us think about 
primates working together.  They will sometimes lend a hand to one another.  Primate 
Alice can‟t reach something, but primate Barney across the way can, and pushes the thing 
to primate Alice.  Primates use one another’s body as tools in collective behaviour—in 
the way that the dogs effectively use one another‟s body as tools in rabbit hunts.  To give 
this phenomenon a handy name, I‟ll call it “tooling up others.”  When we use sticks as 
tools, the thing that is being turned into a tool is inanimate matter.  But perhaps primates 
are geared to group life, and when taking up sticks, they are treating the stick as an 
honorary “hand of another” that is being “tooled up.”   Aristotle (On the Soul 432a1) 
notes that the hand is the instrument that employs instruments (the organ of organs), but it 
could be that for other primates what we call a “tool” figures as an extra hand that lends a 
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hand to a primate‟s hand.  So perhaps the primate‟s behavioural divergence from human 
tool use stems from the fact that sticks do not in fact “tool up” like a primate body does—
sticks are not really animate helping hands.  Tools contrived from inanimate matter are 
our human way of equipping ourselves for “loner-being”; if you want to dig a big hole, 
you either get a bunch of other people together, or build a backhoe, and we now incline 
toward the latter.  But if we abandon our tool-centric and lone-body prejudiced way of 
looking at things, we might find that the original of the tool is not the stick, but the 
other‟s hand, and thence have to reinterpret, e.g., Merleau-Ponty‟s data.  This would give 
us a different comparison of the human and animal.  Perhaps the difference between 
primates and ourselves is not that we take something as something, and they do not, but 
that primates are animists, and expect things themselves to animate themselves as 
something. 
In any case, animals acting and doing things together perhaps do something more 
like human thinking than we would have thought.  The break-up of captivating 
resonances in group behaviour drives animals through seemingly creative interpretations 
of their environment.  No doubt we should think this is different from what we find in 
human thinking behaviour, or Dasein‟s being-in-the-world.  We might want to report this 
difference in terms of self-consciousness, or language, etc.,  but this would probably get 
us caught in the problems we have been trying to avoid.  The analysis so far suggests a 
different way of describing the difference between animal behaviour and human thinking 
behaviour.  (1) What human thinking achieves in short and individual time scales—
creative interpretations of the world, taking something as something—groups of animals 
achieve over longer time scales.  These can be time scales of the group (the dogs figuring 
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out how to hunt rabbits in parking lots), of generations of groups (snow monkeys learning 
how to wash their food and teaching the behaviour to subsequent generations), of species 
(bees evolving to harvest whatever sort of flower might be around).  (2) A human can do 
individually what might otherwise take a group of animals.  But a human can only do the 
latter after learning, from other humans, language and „how to think.‟ This suggests a 
connection between points (1) and (2) in the case of human beings: we learn how to carry 
out what would otherwise take a group of animals, and learn how to do this quickly and 
in an individual way, only by learning and language that connect us with the longer time 
of individual development and human history.  It is as if the human can approximate to 
an isolate thinker because the differences we found distributed across a group of animals 
and the terrain it inhabits get harboured in a language that we contract in our bodies.    
4) Animal Nature 
The above analysis tried to avoid the usual prejudices that haunt comparisons of humans 
and animals and the study of mind: taking the lone animal as the unit of behaviour, 
modelling natural phenomena on human built machines, etc.  But the result of the 
analysis isn‟t merely negative and critical.  It suggests a powerful principle of „natural 
engineering‟: that new senses can arise when a pack of animals runs around or interacts 
in a diversified setting, thus diversifying instinctual processes.  Our usual approach to 
minds, brains and bodies is to model them along the lines of human-engineered 
machines, that neatly sub-divide functions within an architectonic structure; and this 
structure specifies a closed, over and done with individuality of the system.  Why not 
instead think of brains and bodies as akin to a pack of animals?  
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When we turn to the body, e.g., to Buss‟ concept of its individuality, we do not so 
much find a closed individual organized from the top down and the bottom up to fit 
together, we find a bunch of different cell lines roped together from the start so as to form 
an internal environment in which tensions engender diversification.  Lynn Margulis 
(1981; 1992) has shown that eukaryotic cells (the more complex cell type that is the 
building block of multicellular creatures like ourselves) are in fact the endosymbiotic 
result of various different prokaryotic cells (the simpler cell type that constitutes, e.g., 
single celled bacteria) invading one another and sticking it out for the long run.  The 
immunologists teach us that the immune system is a bunch of cellular networks creeping 
through the interstices of the body and interacting with one another to learn how to fight 
invaders (Tauber 1991; Cohen 2000).  And John Russon (1997) has given a persuasive 
philosophical account of the organs of the body as living through an harmonious tension 
with one another.  Why not, then, think of the body as a pack of animals that have roped 
themselves into an internal environment?  This isn‟t meant to be taken in a completely 
literal sense, since this animal pack cannot split up.  The point is rather to provoke a 
different concept of what a body is, especially to get us to think to of the body‟s way of 
making sense of the world not as organized top down by a central organization scheme or 
information processor, but as running laterally through tensions across the body, as 
arising from breakages that arise when different organs with their own animal directions 
are roped together in a collective resonance with the world.  Think of finding your foot 
tapping to music when you we were preoccupied with something else.  Or, watch a 
judge‟s hand creeping over the arm of his chair in Francesco Rosi‟s film Illustrious 
Corpses, as if an animal trying to escape the rest of the body; or, watch Charlotte 
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Rampling‟s face continually and most enigmatically transform itself in François Ozon‟s 
film Under the Sand.  In these phenomena we at once encounter a body in which parts 
seem like animals darting in different directions, yet move in a complex that continually 
reanimates the sense of the whole. 
The case is perhaps more compelling when it comes to the brain.  In several places, 
Daniel Dennett attacks the notion of the “finish line of consciousness,” that is, he attacks 
the notion that there is some central place in the brain or point in time where “it all comes 
together” and consciousness happens.  In doing so he also attacks (or at least should 
attack) the application of human engineering principles to analysis of the brain (Dennett 
1991; Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992).  Investigators like Varela (1999) would seem to 
agree that there is no finish line.  Dennett‟s initial aim is critical and negative: the brain is 
not like a desktop computer‟s CPU, in which a central clock coordinates computation 
such that in a given moment we can decisively say that the overall result of computation 
is here and now contained in the CPU‟s central register; there is no central clock in the 
brain, no temporally or spatially centralized organizing-architectonic structure.  This 
clears the way for a new way of thinking the brain, which in Dennett‟s case unfortunately 
repeats the problem of modelling it on human-built machines.  But I suspect there is a 
stronger point to be learned from Dennett: the sort of brain that we have could not do the 
sort of work that it does if it were centrally organized; it depends on being uncoordinated, 
on neurons firing on their own, yet doing work, because they are roped together through 
interactions that stretch across space and lag in time.  This sort of claim is supported by 
analyses such as Skarda and Freeman‟s (1987) which shows that making sense of smells, 
e.g., depends on chaotic processes that could not be centrally organized.  The brain, we 
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might be able to argue,  needs the sort of distributed dynamic that we find across a pack 
of animals.  Only here the pack of neural animals is roped into thinking not by itself 
chasing rabbits, etc., but by being part of a body that does chase rabbits through the 
landscape, or pet them—or have Peter Rabbit stories read to it.  And of course the neural 
network model conceives brains in something like this way, with the crucial difference 
that it takes the basic structure of networking as fixed and hierarchical, i.e., as un-animal. 
At this point the evolutionary scientist may think my conceptual provocations so 
outrageous as to be cast in the fires of nonsense.  In response I shall invoke a typical 
strategy of evolutionary analysis, one I might otherwise criticise.  The strategy is simple: 
noting that in nature we often find „solutions‟ repeated.  A pack of animals working 
together is effective in creating new senses for survival.  Why evolve a biological version 
of a digital computer, etc., if a pack principle is effective in creating sense?  And here we 
should remember that human brains have evolved to run in packs too.  
I started out by noting how our tradition has taken it as obvious that other animals 
cannot think.  So it was presumed that thinking could not be found in anything animal—
Descartes‟s move.  So we first of all put thinking in a disembodied mind.  Then, when we 
found dualism incoherent, and tried to put thinking back in the body, we modelled it in 
terms of something as un-animal as possible, namely human-made symbol processing 
machines, with their centralized and architectonic structure.   
Here I have headed in the opposite direction, suggesting that we find a conceptual 
model for the brainy-body in the sense creating movement of a pack of animals.  Indeed, 
if we look at recent neurological results, the brain looks more like a pack of animals than 
we would have thought.  Elkhonon Goldberg and an increasing number of neurologists 
 32  
emphasize the astounding plasticity of the brain: Goldberg (2001) discusses how different 
lobes of the brain will move over one another; others show how the brain reorganizes 
after damage; neurogenesis is now an accepted fact; and it seems that dendritic spines, 
and thence synapses, can change their shape in a matter of minutes (cf. Klintsova and 
Greenough 1999; Gage 2003; Holloway 2003).  It seems to me that the brain is in fact the 
most animal part of our body.  All the other organs keep rebuilding themselves along the 
same lines, whereas the brain, according to recent results, keeps changing its internal 
configuration.  The next closest thing to this animality in the body is perhaps the immune 
system, with its massive distribution of recursively interacting cells, which has notably 
been described as a cognitive system; or the darting eyes and the incredible horde of 
muscles, mostly free floating from bone, that make up the face (cf. Cole 1999), which, 
together with the hand (which Kant called the outer brain of man), is the outward face of 
cognition.  Instead of thinking of the brain as the endpoint of a control system, perhaps 
we should think of faces, hands, legs and brain as a multiplex group of animals roped 
alongside one another in one resonating relationship with the world, in which the part of 
brainy animality is to turn toward the inner environment of the body, and the part of the 
face, hands and legs is to be the outer face of this inner environment.   
These conceptual provocations about brains and bodies suggest something 
important for thinking about the relation between thinking and nature.  Instead of boiling 
thinking down into a human-type machine realized in cells rather than silicon, we can 
perhaps find a continuity between thinking and nature through the animals as collectively 
finding sense in moving through their environment, with ever more breakages and 
ruptures, ever more individuality and internality of sense, developing as animals, 
 33  
eventually human animals, couple together and break into one another‟s captivation with 
the environment.  Perhaps animal coupling is the key to decaptivation, which allows for 
the creation of sense.   
In this case we should study the animals some more, and study the body in a new 
light, but also turn back to think about the role of group, animal movement in human 
evolution and society, perhaps even to the evolution of neurons. (What were these strange 
cells before they evolved into neurons?  Could they be an outgrowth of something as 
animally recognitive as the immune system?)  But a new question would then arise: what 
is it about nature that allows for these animal-environment, and animal-animal couplings, 
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with John Russon. 
15
 It could be argued that this parking-lot behaviour is an outgrowth of the behaviour that dogs might 
exhibit chasing a rabbit in an open field.  But a closely cropped open field is likely as much of a human 
artifact as a parking lot, and still affords more hiding for a rabbit, and different purchase for rabbit and dog 
zigging and zagging; and an overgrown wild field, is an altogether different matter.  In any case, we would 
still have to ask how dog packs learn to hunt in new environments as they migrate or humans encroach, and 
conceptually this would lead to results about dog-pack behaviour similar to the ones here derived.   
16
 On this crucial issue of relative timing in predator-prey chases, see Alexander (2002).   
17
 This material came to my attention after submission of this article.  
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